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ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIRGINIA
LEGAL INVESTMENT STATUTE
In recent years there has been a widespread move under way
to liberalize and broaden the present rules pertaining to fiduciary
investment. Many attorneys and trustmen feel that, in light of
today's social and economic conditions, reform of existing legis-
lation is in order. It is felt that it would be wise to examine Vir-
ginia Law on the subject to see if perhaps there is a present need
for reform in this field.
Today in the various American States, the trustee must con-
form in his selection of trust investments to the high standards
expressed either by the Massachusetts Trustees Investment Rule,
.more commonly called the Prudent Man Rule, or limit himself to
the more rigid New York Rule or legal-list theory. The Prudent
Man Rule was laid down in the now famous case of Harvard Col-
lege v. Amoryl by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
March, 1830. In discussing the propriety of the purchase and
retention of certain securities, by fiduciaries of the estate of one
M'Lean, Mr. Justice Putman said:
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that
he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound
discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, dis-
cretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds, considering the probable in-
come, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested."'2
It will be observed that the Massachusetts Rule has a double-
barrelled purpose: a consideration of probable income along with
the probable safety of capital.
Opposing the Prudent Man Rule is the New York Rule which
was laid down in the leading New York case of King v. Talbot.3
Dealing with substantially the same question that was before the
Massachusetts Court, the highest court of the Empire State ruled
that corporate stocks and other "securities" of like character were
not the type of investments which a prudent man would acquire.
Thus where Harvard College v. Amory approved a trustee's action
in retaining and investing in stocks, the New York Court took the
1. Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1830).
2. Id. at 461.
3. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
opposite view. What was the reasoning behind this decision? The
New York Court said:
"The moment the fund is invested in bank, or insurance,
or railroad stock, it has left the control of the trustees;
its safety and the hazard or risk of loss is no longer de-
pendent upon the skill, care, or discretion, in its custody
or management, and the terms of the investment do not
contemplate that it ever will be returned to the trustees.
If it be said, that, at any time, the trustees may sell the
stock (which is but another name for their interest in the
property and business of the corporation) and so repossess
themselves of the original capital, I reply, that is neces-
sarily contingent and uncertain; and so the fund has been
voluntarily placed in a condition of uncertainty ... 4
With this prohibition against common stocks announced in
King v. Talbot, subsequent laws controlling trust investments were
passed in the majority of states specifying those securities which
would be considered lawful investments. These states have come to
be called "Legal-List" states. 5 Thus the battle lines were drawn.
Today we find states which follow either the Prudent Man Rule or
the Legal-List Rule along with a minority of states which have
moved toward the Prudent Man Rule without adopting it in its
pure form. Which view does Virginia have?
Mr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing in the Jan. 1948 Virginia
Law Review 6 on "The Virginia Prudent Man Rule of Trust In-
vestments," made a thorough study of the legal questions involved.
He reached the conclusion that although not expressly adopted, the
Massachusetts Prudent Man Rule is believed to be the law of Vir-
ginia based on more than 100 years of judicial decision. 7 To reach
this conclusion Mr. Powell discussed at length early and modem
Virginia decisions on the subject in conjunction with pertinent
Virginia Statutes pertaining to fiduciary investment. To date no
Virginia decision has been found which specifically makes mention
of either the Massachusetts or New York Rules. However, as early
as 1845 the Virginia Court of Appeals announced in Kee's Executor
v. Kee's Creditors8 its own "Prudent Man Rule." In that case the
Court sustained the action of executors in paying off certain debts
4. Id. at 85-86, 88-89.
5. This applies where the trust instrument is silent as to investment powers.
6. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Virginia Prodent Man Rule of Twst Invest-
ments, 34 VA. L. REV., 102, Jan. 1948.
7. Id. at 102
8. 2 Gratt. 117 (Va. 1845).
and in effecting compromises involving the assets of the trust estate
saying in part:
"The duties of the executor ... are yet to be performed
under the obligations of sound judgment, acting on those
considerations of worldly prudence, which affect the safety
of the pecuniary interests confided to his care. When such
judgment, so governed, is fairly exercised, and (tested
by the facts existing and known at the time it is exercised)
is such as would probably be formed by the judicious man,
managing his own affairs, with reference to considerations
of mere worldly prudence, the executor is justified in
acting on such judgment; and so acting, is not responsi-
ble for alleged losses, resulting from his conduct." 9
This test of prudence laid down inthis landmark case as to the
performance of a fiduciary's duties has been followed by subsequent
decisions10 up to the present day. Perhaps the most notable modern
decision that deserves mention is Harris v. Citizens Bank."1 In that
case the Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Blackstone, acting as exe-
cutor for the estate of Mr. J. M. Harris, retained in the estate a
substantial number of securities. Included in these holdings were
both common and preferred stocks plus stock in the executor bank.
Under the terms of the will, no express powers of retention were
granted to the bank. After some two years had elapsed, the bank dis-
posed of the securities, realizing very substantial losses to the estate.
The Court refused to surcharge the bank for its actions, declaring
that its retention of the securities had been with the express consent
of all the beneficiaries. The Court then said:
"The standard by which the conduct of trustees, executors
and other fiduciaries is to be measured has been many
times stated and restated, both in this State and elsewhere.
They are required to do those things which a man of rea-
sonable intelligence and prudence would be expected to
do in the management of his own affairs, but this rule,
like most rules, is to be construed in the light of conditions
obtaining when it is applied. More would be expected of
the Guaranty Trust Company of New York than of a
county bank at Churchville, which is but to say that negli-
gence itself is an elastic term." 12
9. Id. at 129.
10. For other interesting cases see Elliott v. Carter, 9 Gratt. 541 (Va. 1853);
Powers v. Powers, 174 Va. 164, 3 S.E.2d 162 (1939); Southall v. Taylor,
14 Gratt. 269 (Va. 1858); Koteen v. Bickers, 163 Va. 676, 177 S.BL
904 (1934); Clemons v. Dennis, 165 Va. 18, 181 S.. 387 (1935).
11. Harris v. Citizens Bank, 172 Va. 111, 200 S.E. 652 (1939).
12. Id. at 125, 200 S.E. at 657.
The three most recent decisions involving fiduciary investments
in Virginia have reaffirmed the Prudent Man Doctrine.1 3 Mr.
Justice Browning, who wrote the opinion in Commercial & Savings
Bank of Winchester v. Burton said :14
"The test of what a reasonably prudent person would do
with his own is seen in what a large number of persons,
some of them presumably of that character, did do. The
evidence surely discloses that the vast number of stock-
holders, of the banks in question, in the light of existent
conditions, did not sacrifice their holdings, but clung to
them, hoping for a brighter day."
The above review, though brief in nature, shows rather con-
clusively that Virginia has followed by judicial decision the more
liberal Massachusetts Rule. Unfortunately, for all concerned, the
fiduciary finds himself confronted with § 26-40 of the present Code
of Virginia. This statute is commonly called the "Legal Investment"
Statute, and specifies that "fiduciaries, both individual and corpo-
rate, may invest the funds held by them in a fiduciary capacity in
the following securities, which are and shall be considered lawful
investments... "15
The statute then goes on to list a fairly large number of care-
fully defined types of investments. In general § 26-40 includes:
a) state and governmental securities,
b) bonds, notes, and preferred stocks of public utility and
industrial corporations, (which meet strict specifications),
c) other bonds and notes secured by real estate,
d) securities of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
Railroad,
e) other railroad securities which meet certain specifications.
In general the list excludes:
a) virtually all common stock,
b) many preferred stocks,
c) many corporate bonds.
It is well settled that the above statute is permissive and not
mandatory, and that a fiduciary is not required as a matter of law
to invest the trust estate in only those types of securities described
13. Buckle v. Marshall, 176 Va. 139, 10 S.E2d 506 (1940); Parsons v.
Wysor, 180 Va. 84, 21 S.E.2d 753 (1942); Commercial & Savings Bank
of Winchester v. Burton, 183 Va. 133, 31 SYE2d 289 (1944). (Since
this latter case, no Virginia decision has been found which discusses the
particular issue under consideration.)
14. Id. at 150, 31 S.E.2d at 296.
15. Common phraseology among attorneys and uusten.
as "lawful investments."1 6 However, should the trustee make an
investment as prescribed by § 26-40, he is relieved from liability.17
Therefore we have a very unique situation before us. The fiduciary
in Virginia has a choice of two roads to take:
a) He may rely on more than 100 years of judicial decision
that Virginia has the Massachusetts Rule and invest the
trust assets the way a prudent man would, or
b) invest exclusively in "legals" and enjoy the dubious
immunity afforded him under § 26-40.
How can these two completely divergent views be reconciled?
It is obvious at first glance that he who seeks protection under
§ 26-40 is in effect relieving himself from all responsibility. Under
the legal-list approach, the fiduciary needs no other talent than to be
able to pick investments which satisfy the requirements of § 26-40.
As Mr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. pointed out in his excellent analysis
of "The Virginia Prudent Man Rule Of Trust Investments,"1 8 the
interpretation that the "legal investment" status affords immunity to
those who exclusively follow its provisions has caused most fiduciar-
ies to make only those investments which meet the specifications
of the rule. The argument for following this course of action is that
it is safer to the trustee and removes the possibilty of surcharge. As
a result of investing the trust estate in "legals," however, the life
beneficiary will find himself heavily penalized by the low yields
afforded by the securities offered under § 26-40. When one considers
today's interest rates, which are at an all time low, in conjunction
with a dollar whose purchasing power is at an all time low, it is not
a pleasant picture. 19 Thus the testator whose estate will be governed
by this Statute has inadvertently loaded the dice against those very
people he most wanted to protect.
Viewing the situation in terms of one trust fund does not show
the immensity of the problem. Although one is prone to think of a
trust fund as large, it may come as a surprise that by far the larger
number of trusts are comparatively small. In a survey made by the
Trust Division of The American Bankers Association, more than
16. Powers v. Powers, 174 Va. 164, S.E.2d 162 (1939); Koteen v. Bickers,
163 Va. 696, 177 SE. 904 (1934).
17. Koteen v. Bickers, supra, at 690, 177 S.E. at 909.
18. Powell, op. cit. p. 128.
19. Consumers' Price Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Wholesale Price
Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1800 through 1950. For an interesting
discussion of this problem see Marriner S. Fcdes, Beckoning Frontiers
499 (1951).
half of all trusts administered (54%) had an annual income of less
than $1200. A little over 73% had an income of less than $3,000.,
with an average income of only $788. Of the 144,000 trusts on which
this survey was based, not quite 3% had an income of more than
$25,000.20 Mayo Adams Shattuck estimates that today the total
trust funds in the nation may exceed two hundred billion dollars,
and that this figure is increasing geometrically every year.2' There-
fore it is fair to conclude that the trust is not exclusively reserved
for the "rich man" but is more and more becoming a device to be
utilized by the average American. Quoting Shattuck,"the nation
had become after World War I, a growing aggregation 6f modest
"capitalists. '22 Therefore, a sizable portion of this nation's economic
wealth may be found in trust .portfolios.
Let us now turn to the economic side of the picture and briefly
discuss giving the fiduciary greater freedom in investments, as
opposed to the legal-list approach. The latter guarantees com-
parative regularity and continuity of income. Should the purchasing
power of our dollar follow a steady and stable course, the magic
formula for future security could be had by those who have based
their future welfare on the yearly production of a specific number
of dollars. Unfortunately the buying power of the dollar is now at
about its lowest point in the past 150 years. Anyone who has shop-
ped at the corner grocery recently can testify that five or ten dollars
will no longer buy the family's needs for the week. Thus in a period
of rising prices, and a cheap dollar, the individual living on a fixed
income finds it harder and harder to make ends meet. Yet in spite
of these plain facts, the belief still exists that bonds and mortgages
are inherently safe, while stocks and other equity participations are
speculative and thus to be frowned upon. Would the testator in
attempting to provide for his loved ones measure the success of his
endeavor by the specific number of dollars produced yearly, or by
the purchasing power which his dollars have provided? The "safe"
trustee using the legal-list finds no way to hedge against present
inflationary pressures and protect the life beneficiary the way the
20. Bascom H. Torrance, Legal Backgrounds, Treands and Recent Develop-
ments in the Investment of Trust Funds, Law and Contemporary Prob-
lems, Vol. 17, Winter 1952, No. 1, School of law, Duke University,
p. 142.
21. Mayo A. Shattuck, The Development Of The Prudent Man Rule For
Fiduciary Investment In The United States In The Twentieth Century,
Ohio State Law Journal, Autumn, 1951, p. 499.
22. Id. at 499.
testator would have wanted. It would seem that § 26-40 allows the
fiduciary the unhealthy legality, therefore, of not keeping abreast
with the times in regard to purchasing power and values.
It is interesting to note that one of the prime reasons for the
legal-list, whether mandatory or permissive, is that the bonds and
mortgages classified therein offer inherent safety. Unfortunately the
secured obligation during the past decade or so, has lost much of
its original character.2 3 There has been a marked change in the
attitude of both our courts and legislatures toward the calling of
obligations and foreclosures. 24 The so-called legal moratorium has
indeed transformed the position of the creditor.
During this process, however, the common stock has shown it
deserves a place in any well balanced investment portfolio. This
does not mean that the trustee may buy any stock, nor does it mean
that he may speculate, for this certainly would not constitute a
permanent disposition of one's funds. Similarly, short-haul buying,
the idea of buying today and selling tomorrow for a half-point
profit, is not proper. It does mean that the common stock of one of
our blue-chip corporations, yielding a consistent and reasonable
income through periods of both prosperity and depression, with an
able management at the helm, deserves the tag of "safe" invest-
ment.25 This view would seem justified from the security view-
point when one compares such a stock to a "first mortgage on some
distant bricks or mortar, or railroad trackage, or even a govern-
ment-sponsored bridge, turnpike, water district or school district;
where prosperity may depend upon local conditions utterly beyond
the knowledge and control of the investor."'2
6
The principal reasons for using stocks in a well balanced trust
portfolio have often been pointed out.2 7 Briefly they are: 1) in-
creased diversification, 2) increased income, 3) the possibilities of
future growth, 4) the fear of inflation and a desire to protect against
it.
The S. E. C., known for its conservative policies, stated, "A
23. Edgar Lawrence Smith, Common Stocks As Long Tom Investments,
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930.
Chelcie C. Bosland, The Common Stock Theory of Investment, The
Ronald Press Company, New York, 1937.
24. Mayo Adams Shattuck, The Massachusetts Trustees Investment Rae-
Its Virtues And Defects; An address before the 23rd Mid-Winter Con-
ference of The Trust Division, American Bankers Association, New York,
Feb. 4, 1942, p. 17.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Torrance, op. cit. p. 143.
reasonable capital structure calls for a substantial amount of com-
mon stock equity both as a protective cushion for the bonds and
preferred stock and to prevent temporary declines in earning from
resulting receivership. 28
In his discussion of "Investment Practices Of Trust Com-
panies," Mr. Bascom H. Torrance had this to say about why trustees
invest in stocks: "Stocks have become more and more an accepted
part of the investment field and the capital markets. Information
about them and facilities for studying them are more extensive
than ever before. The markets in which they are traded are more
firmly regulated and less subject to the deliberate manipulation
which at times past gave them risks wholly unrelated to investment
values... They have their own characteristics, and it is for these that
they are bought by understanding investors. But it is important that
they be bought for what they are, and not something else. As the
New York committee stated, the form of an investment alone
should not be the sole determinant of its usefulness.2 9
In practice, trustees who have been able to utilize the Massa-
chusetts Rule and include common stocks in their investment
portfolios have fared far better than their legal-list cousins. The
average yield in recent years has never greatly exceeded 2% for
this latter group, while trustees operating under the Prudent Man
Rule have averaged at least 4% .30 It is a hollow victory for "pru-
dence" when one considers the countless wealth that might have
gone to life tenants but for the legal-list.
For many of the reasons mentioned, in recent years there has
been a veritable parade of states which have adopted the Massa-
chusetts Rule. Perhaps the most notable departure was New York
itself, which now joins a small minority of states taking an inter-
mediate position between the mandatory legal-list and the full
freedom of the Prudent Man Rule.3 1 On April 5, 1950 Governor
Dewey signed a bill which granted to New York fiduciaries a "35%
Prudent Man Rule." Although short of the complete freedom de-
sired by many fiduciaries in the Empire State, it shows conclusively
that New York is headed in the right direction. Other states which
28. 6 SEc. ANN. REP. taken from Shattuck, Ohio State Law Review Journal,
Autumn, 1951. p. 500.
29. Torrance, op. cit. pp. 151-2.
30. Shattuck, op. cit. p. 501.
31. N. Y. Laws 1950 (Chapter 464, July 1, 1950).
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have adopted (in certain cases with slight variations) the Prudent
Man Rule, or The Model Prudent Man Rule Statute prepared and
written by the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association,
include :32
1941-New Hampshire 1947-Oregon
1943-California 1947-Washington
1943-Delaware 1949-Idaho
1943-Minnesota 1949-Kansas
1945-Illinois 1949--Oklahoma
1945-Maine 1951-Utah
1945--Texas 1951-Colorado
1947-Nevada 1951-New Mexico
1951-Tennessee
Other states which have moved towards the Prudent Man Rule
without adopting it in unrestricted form during 1951 include
New Jersey, North Dakota, and South Carolina.3 3 As discussed
earlier, Virginia finds itself in the unique classification of being
of being a Prudent Man Rule State while allowing statutory pro-
tection for those who wish to follow the legal-list theory. The eco-
nomic and social consequences resulting from this confusion demand
legislative reform. With this view in mind, trustees and attorneys
have been recommending that our Commonwealth adopt the Model
Prudent-Man Statute, or a slight variation of that Statute. The
standard of prudence has been prepared by the Committee on
Fiduciary Legislation of the Trust Division of The American
Bankers Association. A reading of its provisions(see appendix)
will show that it has made rather extensive use of the language used
in Harvard College v. Amory. At the same time, however, the
Model Statute will bring to those states which adopt it the wealth
of judicial decisions applying the rule since 1830.
It is important to point out that by adopting the Model Statute,
we would not merely give permission to purchase stocks. We
would be adopting a well knit pattern of restraints and a body of
principles to guide the fiduciary in the discharge of all managerial
functions. No longer would the Virginia fiduciary be confronted by
two sets of rules, but by one-
"what would a man of prudence, discretion, and intelli-
gence do under the circumstances?"
32. For a more complete listing of all states see appendix.
33. Ibid.
The past two generations have witnessed both social and eco-
nomic changes tremendous in their scope. Viewed from the stand-
point of ever-changing circumstances, it is apparent that we need
a rule which permits change.3 4
STATES FOLLOWING THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
California Kansas Minnesota Rhode Island
Colorado Kentucky Missouri Tennessee
Connecticut Maine Nevada Texas
Delaware Maryland New Mexico Utah
Idaho Massachusetts Oklahoma Vermont
Illinois Michigan Oregon Washington
STATES RESTRICTING LEGAL INVESTMENTS TO
BONDS
Alabama Indiana Louisiana Ohio
Florida Iowa Montana Wisconsin
Georgia Wyoming
STATES WHICH HAVE MOVED TOWARD THE PRU-
DENT MAN RULE WITHOUT ADOPTING
IT IN UNRESTRICTED FORM
Nebraska New York North Dakota***South Carolina
New HampshireNorth Carolina*Pennsylvania West Vir-
New Jersey ginia**
Virginia*
* Permissive states
** Prudent Rule authorized for fiduciaries acting for educational
and charitable institutions
*** Prudent Rule authorized for corporate fiduciaries and to the
extent of 50% of trust.
Source: Trust Division-American Bankers Association, as taken
from Investment Practices of Trust Companies, Bascom
H. Torrance, Law And Contemporary Problems, School
Of Law-Duke University, Vol. 17 Winter, 1952. No. I.
NOTE: 4 states not included in the above list-Arizona, Arkansas,
Mississippi and South Dakota-are difficult to classify in
simplified fashion.
34. Other texts and materials greatly aided in the preparation of this review.
Of particular value were: Benjamin Graham and David L Dodd, Secarity
Analysis, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc. New York, 1934.
Charles B. Standsbury, The Dow Theory Explained, Barro's Publishing
Company, Inc. New York, 1938.
THE MODEL PRUDENT-MAN INVESTMENT STATUTE
1. § 1. In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging,
2. retaining, selling and managing property for the benefit of
3. another, a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care
4 under the circumstances than prevailing, which men of prudence,
5. discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their
6. own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the
7. permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
8. income as well as the probable safety of their capital. Within
9. the limitations of the foregoing standard, a fiduciary is au-
thorized
10. to acquire and retain every kind of property real, personal or
11. mixed, and every kind of investment, specifically including but
not
12. by way of limitation, bonds, debentures and other corporate
13. obligations, and stocks, preferred or common, which men of
prudence,
14. discretion and intelligence acquire or retain for their own ac-
count.
14a and within the limitations of the foregoing standard, a fiduciary
14b may retain property properly acquired, without limitation as to
14c time and without regard to its suitability for original purchase.
Note: The foregoing addition to § 1 is included for the
consideration of those states which desire particular
treatment of the retention of trust property.
15. § 2. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed
16. as authorizing any departure from, or variation of, the express
17. terms of limitations set forth in any will, agreement,
18. court order or other instrument creating or defining the fidu-
19. ciary's duties and powers, but the terms "legal investment" or
20. "authorized investment" or words of similar import, as used in
21. any such instrument, shall be taken to mean any investment
which
22. is permitted by the terms of § 1 hereof.
23. § 3. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as
24. restricting the power of a court of proper jurisdiction to permit a
25. fiduciary to deviate from the terms of any will, agreement, or
other
26. instrument relating to acquisition, investment, reinvestment,
27. exchange, retention, sale or management of fiduciary property.
28. § 4. The provisions of this Act shall govern fiduciaries
29. acting under wills, agreements, court orders and other instru-
ments
30. now existing or hereafter made.
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